in the much used Maddison data sets (Maddison ) . For Hungary, the new GDP estimate presented here is the first annual series of national income for the late nineteenth century. However, earlier attempts at measuring aggregate growth have been made on the basis of estimates for two benchmark years such as Katus's () computation of Gross Domestic Material Product for  and .
More recently, David Good adopted a Crafts-type structural equation approach to estimate per capita income levels for five benchmark years in the Habsburg Empire as a function of several proxy variables (Crafts , Good , , ; Good and Ma ) . The main purpose of this work is to estimate relative income levels of the regions and successor-state territories of the Habsburg Empire. Yet it has also been used to assess the relative growth performance of Austria-Hungary. The proxy approach may be a feasible way to approximate output at regional levels for which standard national income measures cannot be computed because of the lack of essential data. For theoretical and conceptual reasons, though, it does not offer an alternative to the national income approach where that can be employed (Maddison ; Pammer ) .

The main comparator for the new estimates is those existing annual estimates of GDP that build on standard national income methodology, that is, Kausel () . For Hungary, no such comparable estimates exist. Katus's () figures do not permit an assessment of the phasing of aggregate economic growth as they include only estimates for the very beginning and the very end of the period under review. The re-estimation of GDP involved the construction of new series for secondary sector output. Here, the relevant comparison is with Komlos's () indices for both Austria and Hungary. Table  summarises the main results of research on the rate of economic growth in the Habsburg Empire.
This article argues, first, that economic growth in the western half of the empire (imperial Austria) failed by a significant margin to keep pace with rates achieved in most other European economies. In terms of per capita income growth, the Austrian economy was not catching up, but falling behind in the late nineteenth century. Hungary, in contrast, recorded a Growth and stagnation in the Habsburg Empire   Pammer () argues that the procedure yields statistical artefacts in terms of both absolute income levels and rates of income growth over time. He maintains that, first, the income estimates are biased as a result of inappropriate functional specification of the estimation equation and the application to relatively backward regions of coefficients which were estimated on the basis of data for relatively advanced economies. Second, individual country effects alter or offset the impact of variables generally associated with income; hence they severely restrict the validity of using these proxy variables (such as crude death rates, the share of the agricultural labour force, and letters posted) for predicting income in other economies. Finally, he questions the validity of using proxy variables that are not theoretically linked to GDP. See Good () and Good and Ma () for a response and revised estimates.
higher than average rate of per capita income growth. Second, the new evidence is more in tune with interpretations that postulate a marked slowdown in Austrian economic activity during the s and s, the 'Great Depression' (Komlos , ; März ; Schulze ), than with the 'revisionist' argument of almost uniform growth between  and  (Good , , ) . Third, the distinct periodicity and differential rates of Austrian and Hungarian growth are consistent with the argument that the outflow of Austrian capital to Hungary after the  Vienna stock market crash was crucial in prolonging economic stagnation in Austria, whilst fuelling the first widespread wave of industrialisation in Hungary (Komlos ) . The rest of the article is organised as follows: Section  describes briefly the derivation of the new GDP estimates, with details on methods and sources provided in the Appendix. Section  offers a comparison with earlier estimates of GDP and industrial production. Finally, Section  summarises the results and points to some of their implications.
. Deriving GDP estimates for the Habsburg Empire
The new estimates of Austrian and Hungarian GDP in constant  prices are based on eight sectoral series (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, handicrafts, trade and communications, public and private services, housing).  These output series and their constituent sub-series are  Table  was projected backwards drawing on a broad range of sector-specific output indices. The methods and sources used in the derivation of these indices are set out in the Appendix.
. A comparison with earlier estimates of GDP and industrial output
Kausel draws on Waizner's estimates of net national income for / which he projected backwards after rebasing them to  and conversion into gross value added format. The main data sources for extrapolation are Sandgruber () for agricultural production, an index of industrial output compiled by Rudolph (), estimates of industrial production for several census years and an approximation of national income for  made by Gross () . Estimates for the tertiary sector are made largely on the basis of material published in Brusatti (). However, virtually all of the substantial difference between Kausel's results and the new GDP calculations is due to the different data and methods used in estimating output in the mining and secondary sectors.
Gross () has produced estimates of industrial output in current prices for , , ,  and /, and deflated these using a German wholesale price index. Rudolph (), in contrast, compiled a weighted Growth and stagnation in the Habsburg Empire   There are some minor exceptions to this rule. First, Sandgruber's () index of output of fieldcrops and wine, which forms the core of the estimate of agricultural production, draws on average / quantities and prices as weights. Second, the new estimate of construction output rests on a composite index which uses  weights derived from Hoffmann (). Third, the value-added estimates for steel refining and electricity generation are measured in  prices, and the estimate for petroleum output is given in  prices.  Many of the sectoral output data provided by Fellner (), Gürtler () and Waizner () are either for single years between  and  or a period average over these years. As a rule, their figures have been converted into  prices, relying on productspecific price indices from Mühlpeck et al. () and rebased to  using branchspecific production indices.
annual index based on volume indicators for five branches (mining, metalmaking, machine-building, food processing, textiles). For  to , Kausel 'joined' these two series in a not altogether transparent way such that their mean rate of growth was taken to reflect the long-run rate of growth of industrial production. Rudolph's annual values were then incorporated into this 'frame' by interpolation. The series so obtained was then used to project backwards total value added in mining, manufacturing, handicrafts production and construction. This procedure and the underlying estimates entail several problems which severely impede the quality of Kausel's  (Kausel A) shows that using Komlos's index leads to a reduction in the overall rate of growth and, perhaps more significantly, to a widening of the growth differential between the two sub-periods. These effects are even more pronounced when the new industrial output estimates are used for adjustment rather than those of Komlos (Table , Kausel A). In terms of growth, the Kausel estimates so adjusted hardly differ from the new GDP per capita estimates, displaying a large growth gap of about . of a percentage point between the - and - periods.
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For Hungary, the timing of economic expansion seems to mirror the Austrian experience in reverse. Trend growth was much faster during - than it was in the following years to  (Table ) . This growth differential and the lower rate of growth over the whole period contrast with Good and Ma () . It should be emphasised that adjusting the new GDP estimates for Hungary by replacing the new secondary sector estimates with the Komlos industrial output index, in a fashion identical to the adjustments of the Kausel estimates, makes no material difference to this finding.

The main message of Table  is, therefore, that both the timing and the rates of per capita income growth in the Habsburg Empire were markedly different from what earlier estimates suggested. Table  shows that in Austria all major sectors of the economy grew more rapidly after the mid-s than before. The growth differential, though, was widest in the secondary sector (including mining). In Hungary, on the other hand, the pattern was more complex. Here it was agriculture that decelerated more strongly than industry, whilst growth in services even increased after . In both halves of the empire, however, the secondary sector was by a significant margin the fastest growing sector over each of the two sub-periods. As a result, its share in constant price GDP increased from  per cent () to  per cent () in Austria, and from about  to  per cent in Hungary (Tables A, A) .
Virtually all of the difference between Kausel and the new GDP estimates 
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 Building on Waizner's () work, Kausel's ()  gross value-added shares are as follows: () agriculture, forestry: .; () mining, manufacturing, crafts, construction: .; () trade, transport: .; () public and personal services: .; () housing: .. These shares are, overall, fairly close to those used in the new estimates (see Table   ). is down to the different treatment of the secondary sector.  However, the new estimates also express a more pronounced temporal pattern of output expansion in the secondary sector than the Komlos () production indices. The overall rate of Austrian industrial growth was practically equal to that estimated by Komlos, but the growth gap between the sub-periods before and after  was much wider (Table ) . For Hungary, the new estimates indicate a higher rate of industrial expansion for - and the two sub-periods (Table ) . Both estimates agree, however, on the sharp deceleration after the mid-s.
These differences result from the inclusion of additional output series not covered in the Komlos indices, from revisions in series such as iron and textiles, and from the different weighting of industrial branches in the aggregate. The Komlos overall index is calculated as the unweighted sum of value added in individual industrial sectors, measured in constant prices. However, weighting is introduced implicitly by the  relative prices with which the sub-series have been combined. Given that the sub-series of the index do not span the full range of industrial sectors, this kind of implicit weighting leads to different results than the explicit weighting adopted here. First, handicrafts production, which in  accounted for more than a fifth of total secondary sector output in both Austria and Hungary (Table ) , is not included in the Komlos estimates. Second, construction, constituting about  and  per cent of Austrian and Hungarian value added in the secondary sector (Table ) , is represented in the Komlos index only by railway building and maintenance. In contrast, the new estimates (especially for Austria) also comprise road and waterway construction, a proxy for commercial investment in buildings and a series for residential construction (see Appendix). Third, the Komlos manufacturing series includes eight subseries (beer, sugar, spirits, iron, flour, woollen textiles, cotton textiles, electricity), while the new estimates build on about double that number. The
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  This is confirmed by substituting the new agricultural output index for Kausel's series which has no effect on GDP per capita growth. Both the new estimates and Kausel rely largely on Sandgruber () for the computation of output in agriculture and forestry. (Table ) . Albeit from a comparatively low base, this was a sector that, in Austria, expanded faster during the first two decades under review than thereafter. In Hungary, there was no significant difference in the growth of mining during the two sub-periods. The new estimates, being based on the total of value added in the industrial sector rather than on a sub-sample, correct for the implicit weighting bias by reducing the overall weight of this branch in the industrial aggregate.
Second, construction is also given a more prominent weight. However, in comparison to Komlos, the new construction indices for both halves of the empire entail positive rates of expansion over all sub-periods, and, for Austria, a much less pronounced growth differential between the two subperiods (Tables , ) .
 Hence this treatment of the construction sector is, if at all, biased against the view advanced here. The new construction series are more comprehensive, as noted above, and cyclically far less volatile than series based on railway construction alone.
Third, according to Fellner () and Waizner () the handicrafts sector accounted for approximately one fifth of secondary sector output (including mining) before the First World War. It is not incorporated in the Komlos estimates. Here, a value added share weighted index of manufacturing and construction has been used as a proxy (see Appendix). This feeds into an overall rate of 'industrial' growth in Austria that is slightly higher for the whole period, lower for - and higher for - (Tables , ) .
Finally, manufacturing assumes a lower weight in the new estimates of industrial output than in the Komlos index (Table ) . Again, this is an outcome of explicit weighting and the fuller coverage of industries that make up the secondary sector as a whole. Irrespectively, it is manufacturing that primarily drives the pattern of expansion of the secondary sector and makes for much of the difference between Komlos's and the new estimates. The latter cover an additional set of manufacturing branches that () expanded fairly rapidly over the whole period and () more importantly displayed pronounced growth differentials between the two sub-periods in both Austria and Hungary. These include the engineering and metalworking industries. The coverage of those branches, in turn, implies a reduction in the weight accorded to other branches within manufacturing. Tables A and A present annual output indices for groups of related manufacturing branches, documenting the effects of the wider coverage of the new estimates. For example, Austria's engineering sector as a whole (mechanical engineering, transport engineering, electrical engineering, instruments and apparatus) expanded at . per cent per annum between  and , but at . per cent thereafter. Hungarian engineering output, on the other hand, increased at a higher rate before the mid-s than after, though the growth differential was not nearly as wide as for Austria.
. Results and implications
The new GDP estimates suggest a pattern of Habsburg economic growth that is distinctly different from that implied in earlier national product estimates. First, Austria's GDP per capita grew by only  per cent per annum between  and  (Table ) . Whilst confirming the tendency towards downward adjustment of the Austrian growth rate during the last twenty or so years of research, this result places Austria near the bottom of the European growth league for the period under review (Table ) . Second, economic growth in Hungary was faster than in the western half of the empire and this result matches with most previous estimates. In European comparison, Hungarian per capita growth of . per cent per annum was about mid-range. Third, for both halves of the empire the new estimates reflect a pattern of expansion that was far from uniform over time. The comparative growth rates presented in Tables  and  indicate that Austrian growth in the two decades after  proceeded at a rate between . and . of a percentage point below Kausel's and Good and Ma's () estimates. Moreover, the increase in the rate of growth of Austrian per capita GDP after  was not on a par with that achieved elsewhere. The post- period was one of incomes generally rising at higher rates than before. The unweighted average growth rate for twelve European countries rose from  per cent per annum for - to . per cent for - (Table , excluding Switzerland). Finally, in contrast to previous estimates, Hungarian GDP per capita growth decelerated after  to a rate below the European average. This was to a considerable extent an outcome of the sharp slow-down in agriculture after , when it was still the dominant sector in terms of both output and employment. Service sector output even accelerated during this period and although industrial growth was slower than in the preceding two decades, it still continued at an annual rate of more than  per cent to  (Table ) . These results raise several questions about the process of growth in the Habsburg Empire.
.. The pace of growth
The literature stresses the eighteenth century antecedents of nineteenth century economic expansion in Austria (Good , Komlos  (Palairet ) .  Yet in the broad context of European growth in the period this was an extreme experience and the problem remains: if initially low levels of per capita output (or labour productivity) entail the potential for faster growth than in the more advanced economies (Gerschenkron , Abramovitz ), then the question arises why the western half of the empire failed to expand at a pace broadly commensurate with its relative GDP position. For example, the economies of three other European countries with roughly comparable levels of per capita GDP in , that is, Italy, Spain and Norway, grew markedly faster during the period up to  (Table ) . Using Good and Ma's () 'imperial Austria/modern Austria' ratios to make some tentative approximations of per capita output levels in the territories of modern Austria, we might ask by the same token why the economically most advanced part of the Habsburg Empire failed to keep pace with the expansion achieved in countries such as Denmark, France and Germany, all of which had broadly similar GDP per capita levels in . Nachum Gross (, p.) argued that 'long-run industrial growth in nineteenth century Austria was not sufficiently rapid to make her economy relatively less backward at the end of the period than it had been in the middle of the century'. The new evidence on economic growth supports this assessment. Moreover, given her dominant weight in total output of the empire, imperial Austria's lacklustre performance meant that the customs union's growth record was also poorer than that of most other European economies. 
Growth and stagnation in the Habsburg

.. The periodicity of growth
The very low rates of per capita growth between  and , both relative to rates of expansion achieved elsewhere in Europe during this period and relative to Austria's post- record, are an expression of the Great Depression that affected the western part of the Habsburg Empire after  (März , ; Komlos ). Moreover, the distinct timing and differential rates of Austrian and Hungarian growth are consistent with the view that the direction of intra-empire capital flows played a crucial role in prolonging economic stagnation in Austria after the  Vienna stock market crash and fostering economic expansion in Hungary. Subsequent to the crash and as a result of Austrian investors' preferences for safe bonds, capital left Austria for Hungary (Komlos ; cf. Pammer, ) . This outflow of capital was paralleled by a dramatic contraction in machinery investment and low rates of industrial growth. In Hungary, on the other hand, the inflow of Austrian funds allowed a substantial increase in investment and was instrumental in stimulating a process of rapid industrialisation (Schulze ). These trends were only reversed in the late s/early s when capital was repatriated to Austria and industrial activity there picked up again, coinciding with a slow-down in Hungarian growth. In contrast to the argument advanced in Good (, , ), the evidence  For what looked like a relatively favourable income position in  was to be eroded during the protracted stagnation of the s and s and, most importantly, was not to be regained in the following decades to . By the time of the First World War, imperial Austria's relative income position had deteriorated against nine of the  other countries in Table  when compared with .
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To some extent a better understanding of the nature of this prolonged stagnation requires a look back to the preceding decades. To what extent was Austria's economic performance during the Great Depression marked not only by a deviation from its course after, say,  but also from what was happening before ? Unfortunately, the data at our disposal are severely limited. There are no annual estimates of national product that would permit a reasonably satisfactory assessment. Yet some observations can be made nevertheless on the basis of industrial output.
During the s, there came first a sharp downturn in Austrian industrial production () which was eventually followed by extremely rapid recovery growth from . The initial contraction was first and foremost an outcome of the cotton famine associated with the American civil war, which led to a  per cent fall in cotton imports in . In its wake, output in other manufacturing branches contracted too, albeit at considerably lower rates than in the cotton industry (Liese and Schulze ). It seems probable, however, that the available data overestimate somewhat the effect of this exogenous shock on manufacturing output and subsequent expansion. The  weight of cotton textiles in Komlos's manufacturing index (Komlos , Table E) is far higher ( per cent) than it would be if the full range of manufacturing branches were covered in the index ( per cent). These problems notwithstanding, the evidence on industrial growth points to rapid expansion prior to , a marked slowdown thereafter and acceleration from the mid-s. Using an index for mining, manufacturing and construction in Austria and measuring from peak to peak, the following average annual rates apply: -, . per cent; -, . per cent; -, . per cent. The phasing of expansion in Hungarian industry is in line with the pattern that Komlos has drawn, even if growth rates differ somewhat over individual cycles. There was rapid growth between  and the early s, a marked slow-down up to  and renewed vigorous growth again to the last peak before the First World War (). As such the new estimates of industrial output support the argument that the timing of economic growth in Hungary was influenced not only by changes in the volume and direction of intra-empire capital flows, but also by the related changes in government expenditure and movements in Hungary's terms of trade vis-à-vis Austria. The latter improved during the s and s (causing a rise in Hungarian real incomes), worsened from , and turned favourable again after . The transfer of funds from Austria after  was associated with fiscal expansion. With the repatriation of Austrian capital in the mid-s, growth in government expenditure slowed to a rate below the increase in taxes and government investment stagnated. From , government expenditure grew again far faster than taxes. Though primarily funded out of domestic resources, the associated rise in national debt growth was augmented by a growing inflow of foreign capital (Komlos , pp. -).

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At the aggregate level, however, the impact of these stimuli and constraints was less clear cut. Although GDP growth fell markedly after , there was no subsequent increase in the growth rate after . This was an outcome of the performance of the rural economy. Output growth in the primary sector decelerated heavily after  to about half a per cent per annum. This more than compensated for the rapid expansion in industry and the  per cent annual increase in service sector output. As it turns out, the pattern of Hungarian growth throughout the late nineteenth century was to a significant extent shaped by agriculture. Over the period under review, Hungary's economy expanded most rapidly between  and  (. per cent per annum). Nearly  per cent of all GDP growth that occurred during this period was a result of agriculture's vigorous expansion (Table  ) . During the next cycle to , when aggregate growth declined slightly to . per cent, the continuing rise in industrial output (over  per cent) was counterbalanced by the rural sector's falling contribution to GDP growth. That rose again in the following decade when growth in GDP and industry was at its slowest (. and . per cent, respectively), while agriculture expanded again at a slightly higher rate. Thus, in conjunction with the stable rate of expansion in services, agricultural growth helped to some extent in reducing the adverse effects of the contraction in industry. However, after , as noted above, the primary sector became a major drag on economic growth, effectively preventing a return to the high rates of expansion prevalent during the s and s.

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In Austria, the primary sector's relative contribution to GDP growth in each of the four sub-periods was more limited than in the eastern half of the empire. This reflects the rural sector's much smaller share in national product and lower rates of expansion than in Hungary. Only during the cycle - did agriculture contribute more than  per cent to aggregate growth (Table ) . However, even then agricultural growth was not sufficiently rapid to raise GDP growth significantly above the  per cent mark. For this was the period when both the secondary and the tertiary sectors were almost stagnant, expanding by less than  per cent per annum. During the next cycle to , sluggish expansion in the primary sector became a severe constraint. First, it reduced the impact on GDP growth of the industrial revival after  and of the marked rise in service sector output. Second, slow growth in rural incomes is likely to have reduced demand for manufactures and may have contributed to slow growth in industry during the s. In the following cycle to , output of the primary sector rose at higher rates than before, augmenting the effects of the industrial upsurge. However, in the last period -, when the industrial sector and services continued to expand at almost the same rates as during -, agriculture made no contribution to GDP growth. As in Hungary, it was stagnation in the rural economy that led to a slowdown in GDP growth in the last five years or so before the First World War. 
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. Conclusions
First, the Austrian economy failed to catch up with the leaders and continued to fall behind most other European economies in terms of GDP per capita growth. Second, the extent of the post- depression in Austria was such that it affected not only the industrial sector but left its imprint on the aggregate economy. Third, the broad pattern of industrial expansion in one half of the empire coinciding with contraction in the other is also reflected in the behaviour of national product. Fourth, despite rapid industrial advance, the rural sector continued to dominate the pattern of growth in Hungary into the early twentieth century. Finally, Hungary's economy grew at a markedly faster rate than Austria's over the period as a whole and ranked about mid-range in the European growth comparison. Livestock. (A): Volume indices for meat, milk and wool production were computed by interpolation between the , , , , and  benchmark estimates produced by Sandgruber (, Tables , , ), and either extrapolated to  or amended by additional data given in Fellner () and Waizner (). The volume index of silk production is based on Sandgruber's period averages and, for  to , on Fellner (). An index composed of the four series, with  value added shares as weights, was then used to estimate total livestock production. (H): Index based on Katus's ( , Table ) Tables E, E) . For Austria, these estimates encompass eight mining products (anthracite, lignite, iron ore, silver, mercury, copper, lead, zinc), which account for  per cent of the gross value of total mining output in  (SHB ), plus output of crude oil and salt. The Hungarian estimates cover eleven mining products.
Manufacturing
Beer, sugar, spirits, flour. (A),(H): Four separate indices of value added in beer, sugar, spirits, and flour production by Komlos (, Tables E, E). Trend extrapolation for spirits -.
Tobacco. (A): The volume and value of output of tobacco products is given in the official statistics. Thus a series of gross output in constant  prices was readily available and converted into value added, using a proportion of  per cent (Fellner , Waizner ) . (H): Volume index based on output data from the official statistics (MSE, various issues) for - and trend extrapolation for -.
Petroleum. (A): Volume index of Austrian crude oil production derived from the official statistics. Domestically produced crude oil accounted for between  and  per cent of crude oil input in Austrian refineries. (H): As no adequate data are available it was assumed that output in this small sector (see Table  ) expanded in line with manufacturing as a whole.
Iron and steel. (A), (H): For both Austria and Hungary, the volume and value of cast iron and pig iron production are well documented in the official statistics (SJB, SHB, MSE). Drawing on input cost coefficients from Waizner () and Burnham and Hoskins () , a value added proportion of  per cent was used for smelting. The Austrian  price of pig iron was . crowns per ton and that of cast iron . crowns. The volumes of Austrian and Hungarian steel production are reported in Kupelwieser (), Schuster () and ÖZBH (-), while estimates of wrought iron output were taken from Schulze (). Value added in refining was then computed by, first, converting steel and wrought iron output into value terms (using the  mean of plate and bar iron prices in Austria, i.e.  crowns per ton; a  price is not available) and, second, applying a constant value added proportion of  per cent (Komlos ) . This procedure differs from Komlos's estimates of value added in iron and steel production mainly in its reliance on contemporary records on the actual volume of steel and, partially, wrought iron output. This helps avoid the tricky issues of stock variations and the use of scrap that may affect estimates of wrought iron and steel output derived solely from output and net imports of pig iron. In addition, the further processing of iron and steel in the metal working industry has been estimated separately (see below). Note that neither Fellner () nor Waizner () account for value added in refining. The estimation equation for Austria's value added in iron smelting and refining was:
where Q  is the volume of pig iron output, Q  the volume of cast iron output, Q  the volume of steel output and Q  the volume of wrought iron production. The estimates for Hungary were produced in identical fashion but rely on Hungarian price data.
Mechanical engineering. (A), (H): Annual estimates of output are taken from Schulze () where the estimation methods and sources used are set out in detail. These estimates build on wage-sums paid in the machine-building industry and on the volume of iron and steel inputs. Hoffmann's steam engine price index for Germany was revised so as to account for Austrian rather than German input prices (Hoffmann ) . This revised price index was used for deflating output in all four engineering series.
Transport engineering. (A), (H): Output in this engineering branch was estimated as for mechanical engineering, drawing on material reproduced and sources cited in Schulze (). For both branches, the value-added proportion was  per cent.
Electrical engineering. (A): Wage-bill data are available only for  to  and for these years value added was calculated as for mechanical engineering. An initial attempt to approximate value added in this 'new' industry by use of a series of the number of telephones (Komlos ) was abandoned, as the growth in this series outstripped that of the electrical engineering series by a very large margin during the years with overlap. Using iron and steel inputs for extrapolation did not seem sensible either, as a considerable proportion of output is not iron and steel intensive. Instead, a log-linear trend was fitted to obtain values for the missing years. (H): Index comprises the series for mechanical and transport engineering with  value added shares as weights, as no branch-specific data are available for extrapolation. , Table E ). These have been combined with linen production using their respective  shares in total value added as weights. Linen textiles production was estimated in a two stage process (spinning, weaving) on the basis of domestic flax production, net imports of flax and net imports of linen yarn. Given the high rate of non-marketed output (Sandgruber ) , it was assumed that only half of domestically produced flax was used for commercial linen production. The value added proportions were  per cent for both spinning and weaving (Fellner , Gross ) . Rates of conversion from flax to yarn ( per cent for domestically produced flax fibre and  per cent for imported flax) and from yarn to cloth ( per cent) are taken from Hoffmann (). According to the official export statistics, the average  price of yarn was . crowns per kilogram; the price of cloth was . crowns. The estimation equation for value added in linen spinning and weaving was: Table E) .
Leather and rubber. (A), (H): It was assumed that value added in this branch grew in line with value added in textiles and clothing, i.e. the respective weighted textile indices have been used. Electricity generation. (A): Output was approximated in four stages. The number of central power stations is available for , when the first station was built in Austria, to  (Matis and Bachinger ) and for  to  (Österreichisches Handelsmuseum ). For the years between  and , the number of generating plants was approximated by linear interpolation. Total electricity output (in kw) and output per power station is available only for  to  (Österreichisches, Handelsmuseum ). It was assumed that electricity output per unit rose between  and  at the same rate as for  to . Multiplying estimated unit output by the actual (-) and estimated (-) number of power stations yielded annual estimates of total electricity output for the years with missing data, which were then combined with the original data for  to . Finally, the output series so obtained was used to calculate value added for  to  on the basis of the  value added/physical output ratio. Note that this series is measured in  prices. (H): No adequate data are available for Hungary and it was assumed that electricity output there rose at the same rate as Austria's.
Fuel; light; wood-working; paper-making; printing; chemicals; misc. (A), (H): No data are available for Austria and Hungary and it was assumed that value added grew in line with manufacturing as a whole. Note that total output in these branches accounted for only  per cent of Austrian GDP and  per cent of total commodity output in  ( and  per cent, respectively, for Hungary; see Table  ).
Construction
(A): Weighted index that includes an infrastructure series, a series for residential building, and a series for commercial investment in buildings (machinery production as a proxy). The infrastructure series is composed of Komlos's (, Table E ) index for value added in railway construction and repair, and two new indices for road construction and inland waterway construction which draw on official data (annual issues of SJB and SHB). Using a proportion of  per cent, value added in road construction was estimated for new construction and for maintenance on the basis of road length and expenditure data. The cost of constructing one kilometre of new road in  was approximately , crowns per year; that of maintaining one kilometre of road was , crowns.  The incomplete and inconsistent data on the length of inland waterways necessitated to estimate value added in the construction of waterways solely on the basis of public expenditure data.
 A new series was obtained by deflating total annual outlays for new construction and maintenance (using the general price index of Mühlpeck et al. () ) and applying a value added proportion of  per cent. The three indices for railway, road and waterway construction are combined using  shares in joint value added as weights.
The new series for residential construction is based on additions to the housing stock as recorded in the censuses and adjusted for population growth to correct for the effects of unrecorded changes in the average size of residential dwellings (annual issues of SJB and SHB).
Finally, the infrastructure, residential and commercial building indices are combined using  weights derived from Hoffmann ().
(H): No data are available on changes in the housing stock. Residential construction was, therefore, estimated on the basis of population growth and the assumption that the average number of residents per dwelling in Austria applied also to Hungary. Data on road and waterways construction are either lacking altogether or are incomplete and inconsistent. Hence the infrastructure series is  European Review of Economic History  These figures are based on the average  expenditure on state roads (, crowns per kilometre) and the assumption that the ratio between the costs of new construction and the costs of maintenance approximated to that which applied in railway construction (Komlos ) .  Note, however, that in  state expenditure on inland waterways accounted for less than half the expenditure on state roads which, in turn, made up only about  per cent of the total road network.
based solely on railway construction and repair (Komlos , E; three year moving average to smooth the impact of the high level of volatility in railway construction). As for Austria, machinery production has been used as a proxy for commercial building. The three series are combined using the same weights as for Austria.
Handicrafts (A), (H): The share of handicrafts production in commodity output remained more or less constant throughout the late nineteenth century (Gross , Fellner ) . The official census data would suggest, moreover, that the handicrafts sector did not lose out to industry in terms of employment. In short, there is little evidence that the handicrafts sector declined in absolute or relative terms. This resilience can be explained, at least partly, by this sector's shift into custom production, components making and repair work. It was, therefore, assumed that value added in handicrafts production expanded in line with manufacturing and construction, i.e. weighted indices of manufacturing and construction were used for extrapolation. The respective  shares of manufacturing and construction in combined value added were used as weights. 
Trade, transport and communications
